



South Australian Protective Security Framework

INFOSEC2 ACCESSING OFFICIAL INFORMATION



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INFOSEC2: ACCESSING OFFICIAL INFORMATION

PURPOSE

1. This policy ensures all South Australian Government agencies provide timely, reliable, and appropriate access to official information to assist in facilitating efficient and effective delivery of government services. Availability of accurate information aides in the development of new products and services, enhances consumer and business outcomes and assists with decision-making and policy development.

CORE REQUIREMENT 8

Ensure official information is available to those who need it

SUPPORTING REQUIREMENTS

2. To ensure official information is available to those who need it, agencies¹ must:
 - I. ensure information is accessed only by personnel with a legitimate need-to-know
 - II. ensure personnel requiring ongoing access to sensitive information have undertaken the appropriate pre-employment screening checks
 - III. ensure personnel requiring ongoing access to security classified information have the appropriate security clearance² and meet any additional suitability requirements³
 - IV. put in place an agreement or arrangement⁴ to enable sensitive or security classified information to be shared with personnel or organisations outside of the South Australian Government
 - V. manage access to information systems by implementing unique user identification, authentication and authorisation practices for each approval of system access
 - VI. ensure temporary access to security classified information is strictly controlled according to the requirements of this policy

¹ This policy applies to all South Australian public sector agencies (as defined in section 3(1) of the [Public Sector Act 2009](#)) and to any other person or organisation that is generally subject to the direction of a Minister of the Crown; all of which are referred to in this policy as "Agencies".

² Some office holders are not required to hold a security clearance. See [Security clearance exemptions](#) for the full list

³ Some caveats or codeword information **may** impose additional requirements on the individual *in addition to* the security clearance. Please refer to PSPF policy [Access to information](#) for more detail.

⁴ Such as a contract or deed which outlines how the information is to be used and what protections **must** be applied.

GUIDANCE

APPLYING THE NEED-TO-KNOW PRINCIPLE

3. The need-to-know (NTK) principle reflects the need for personnel to only access information where there is an operational need to do so. Applying this principle to agency information security practices helps personnel to understand their responsibilities to protect information from compromise.
4. NTK works to reduce unauthorised access to, and potential compromise of, relevant official information, whilst also enabling positive information sharing between people where an operational benefit would be derived.
5. Access to sensitive and security classified information **must** be limited to authorised personnel whose responsibilities require access to that information. Access **must not** be given based upon convenience, an individual's status, position, rank or level of authorised access.

PRE-EMPLOYMENT SCREENING CHECKS

6. Personnel who have a requirement for ongoing access to sensitive information (**OFFICIAL: Sensitive**) **must** undertake appropriate pre-employment screening checks. The list of **required** and **recommended** pre-employment screening checks can be found under South Australian Protective Security Framework (SAPSF) policy [Recruiting employees](#).
7. Agencies are **responsible for** ensuring their satisfaction that their employees meet all the identified suitability requirements.

SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SUITABILITY REQUIREMENTS

8. In addition to NTK, personnel requiring ongoing access to security classified information **must** have a valid security clearance at the appropriate level. **Table 1 – Minimum security clearance levels for ongoing access to information** lists the required security clearance for each level of classification.

Table 1 – Minimum security clearance levels for ongoing access to information

Information Classification	Security Clearance Level Required
UNOFFICIAL	Not applicable
OFFICIAL	Security clearance not required. Appropriate pre-employment screening is sufficient
OFFICIAL: Sensitive	Security clearance not required. Appropriate pre-employment screening is sufficient
PROTECTED	Baseline security clearance or above
SECRET	Negative Vetting 1 security clearance or above



SECURITY CLEARANCE EXEMPTIONS

9. Some Australian office holders are not required to hold a security clearance to access security classified information while exercising the duties of the office. Australian office holders who do not need a security clearance are:
 - a. Members and senators of the Commonwealth, state parliaments and territory legislative assemblies
 - b. Judges of the High Court of Australia, the Supreme Court, Family Court of Australia, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, and magistrates
 - c. royal commissioners
 - d. the Governor-General, state governors, Northern Territory administrator
 - e. members of the Executive Council at both the Federal and State and Territory levels
 - f. appointed office holders with enabling legislation that gives the same privileges as the office holders already identified e.g. members of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
10. Staff of the office holders above are not exempt from the security clearance requirements.
11. For information regarding personnel security clearance assessments, see the PSPF policy: [Eligibility and suitability of personnel](#).

CAVEATED INFORMATION

12. Caveat owners **may** impose additional access or suitability requirements on top of the classification. Personnel accessing caveated information **must** meet all clearance and suitability requirements imposed by the originator.
13. SAPSF policy [Protecting official information](#) provides guidance on caveats that **may** be encountered in the South Australian Government.
14. The **SA CABINET** caveat requires that all personnel accessing information bearing that caveat **must** sign a SA Cabinet Confidentiality Agreement. Further information can be found in the [SA Cabinet website](#).⁵
15. Some caveats limit access based on citizenship. The releasability caveats **AUSTEO** (Australian Eyes Only), **AGAO** (Australian Government Access Only) and **REL** (Releasable to) preclude certain people from accessing that information or material.
16. Agencies **must** not share information caveated **AUSTEO** with a person **who is not** an Australian citizen (dual citizenship does not preclude access). If there is a

⁵ Handling and protection requirements for Commonwealth caveated information are not all publicly available. The Sensitive Material Security Management Protocol (SMSMP) sets out the protection and handling requirements for caveated information. The SMSMP is available to entity security advisors via [GovTeams](#)



business need to share **AUSTEO** caveated information with a non-citizen, the owner **may** reconsider applying the caveat or amending the classification (see SAPSF policy [INFOSEC1: Protecting official information](#)).

17. Similarly, **AGAO** **must not** be shared with a person who is not an Australian citizen.⁶

INFORMATION SHARING AGREEMENTS

18. Access to, and use of, official information can be necessary for an external entity's⁷ operations, however, additional risks arise from sharing official information externally of government.
19. Because the SAPSF and associated requirements apply only to South Australian public sector agencies, external entities may not apply commensurate information security policies or practices. As a result, in incidents of information compromise, there may be limited options for recourse or recovery.
20. As such, this policy requires that all agencies **must** put in place a formal, legally binding, written agreement, such as a contract or deed, with external entities with whom they share, or may share, sensitive or security classified information.
21. Such an arrangement **must** ensure the external entity understands the obligations to protect government information to the same standard as outlined in the SAPSF, and that use of the information is not inconsistent with the [Information Privacy Principles \(IPPS\) Instruction](#).
22. For guidance on information sharing agreements outside of Australia, see SAPSF policy [Security governance for international sharing](#).

MANAGING ACCESS TO INFORMATION

23. A well-structured, robust ICT system provides personnel the right tools and access to effectively undertake their work. It also assists to protect information, systems and intellectual property from compromise.
24. Access to networks, operating systems, applications and information **should** be controlled by:
 - a. establishing a clear understanding of the information held on such systems
 - b. effective user identification and authentication practices.
25. For guidance on ICT system development, see the SAPSF policy [Robust ICT and cyber security](#).

⁶ **AGAO** material is releasable to appropriately cleared representatives of Five-Eyes foreign governments on exchange or long-term posting to Australian Intelligence Community agencies.

⁷ External entities **may** include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), contractors or service providers and **may** include individuals or organisations.



USER IDENTIFICATION, AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORISATION PRACTICES

26. All agencies **should** know who is accessing their information and when. To mitigate unauthorised or inappropriate access to and use of official information, agencies **must** establish formal user registration and de-registration procedures for granting and revoking access to information systems.
27. All users **must** be authenticated on each occasion they seek access to information systems. Establishing uniquely identifiable user processes ensures a greater degree of accountability that information is being access appropriately.
28. Methods to authenticate access include:
 - a. passphrases (preferred) or passwords⁸
 - b. biometrics
 - c. cryptographic tokens
 - d. smart cards
29. Agencies **may** reduce the risk of unauthorised access or compromise by:
 - a. using multi-factor authentication (MFA - two or more authentication methods) where users provide something they know (e.g., passphrase/password), something they have (e.g. physical token) and/or something they are (e.g. biometrics)
 - b. increasing the complexity of single authentication methods (passphrases/passwords) by increasing the minimum length and use of alphanumeric and special characters.
30. Agencies **should** regularly review user access rights to provide confidence that access to sensitive or security classified information is for authorised purposes only.

HIGH-RISK USERS

31. Some users or system access incur a greater level of risk, such as system or network administrators and managers, database administrators, privileged users (and other similar positions of trust) and remote access users.
32. System and network managers, for example, have a high degree of trust placed upon them to both enable appropriate access to information while protecting and not misusing their own privileged access.
33. High-risk users **should** use MFA to ensure their identity on each occasion system access is granted.

AUTHORISING ACCESS TO ICT SYSTEMS

34. Robust authorisation processes help agencies to effectively control access to their ICT systems, networks, (including remote access), infrastructure and applications. Agencies **should** implement processes to manage authorised access to systems

⁸ The Australian Cyber Security Centre provides advice on improving password security at [Creating Strong Passphrases](#)



holding sensitive and security classified information. [Table 2](#) outlines the recommended access authorisation measures.⁹

Table 2 Recommended access authorisation measure

Type of access authorisation	Recommended process
User access management	Ensure systems for managing passwords are interactive and require users to follow good security practices in the selection and use of passwords or passphrases.
Authorised network access	- Consider the use of automatic equipment identification as a means to authenticate connections from specific locations and equipment. Control physical and logical access to diagnostic and configuration ports. - Restrict the ability of users to connect to shared networks, including those that extend across agency boundaries. - Segregate groups of information services, users and information systems, based on an agency risk assessment. - Implement routing controls for networks to ensure computer connections and information flows do not breach other relevant access management measures
Authorised operating system access	- Control access to operating systems through a secure log-on procedure. - Restrict and tightly control the use of utility programs that may be capable of overriding system and application controls. - Display restricted access and authorised use only (or equivalent) warnings upon access to all agency ICT systems and shut down inactive sessions after a defined period of inactivity. - Consider restricting connection times to provide additional security for high-risk applications.
Application and information access	Afford sensitive systems a dedicated (isolated) computing environment, in accordance with agency risk assessment.
Mobile computing and communications	Adopt security measures to protect against the risks of using mobile computing and communications facilities.

TEMPORARY ACCESS TO SECURITY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

35. Temporary access to security classified information up to **SECRET** without a security clearance can be permitted under strict circumstances where the correct risk assessment has been completed.
36. Temporary access **may** include:
 - a. short-term¹⁰ where the person does not hold a valid security clearance but can demonstrate a valid need-to-know, and the risks can be adequately mitigated. This **may** include, but is not limited to:

⁹ Please refer to the [SACSF](#) for more detailed information on how to implement these measures

¹⁰ Short-term is considered a maximum of three (3) months in a 12-month period.



- i. new starters
 - ii. people on short, fixed-term projects
 - iii. people who are reasonably expected to only have incidental or accidental contact with security classified information (e.g., security guards, cleaners, external IT personnel, or visitors who do not have an ability to comprehend the classified information)¹¹
- b. provisional access,¹² where the person has commenced a clearance process by providing the relevant details for assessment by a vetting agency. The type of temporary access can be changed from short-term to provisional once the vetting agency has confirmed that the completed security clearance pack has been received and advises the agency that no initial concerns have been identified.
37. All temporary access **must** be supervised, including:
- a. escorting visitors in premises where classified information is stored or used
 - b. management oversight of the work of personnel with temporary access
 - c. monitoring and auditing incidents of contact with security classified information¹³
38. Temporary access to **TOP SECRET** information **must not** be given unless the personnel seeking access holds an existing Negative Vetting 1 security clearance.
39. Temporary access to caveated information **must** only be granted where all suitability requirements are also satisfied.

RISK ASSESSMENT FOR TEMPORARY ACCESS

40. When assessing risk for temporary access to security classified information, agencies **should** include the following considerations:
- a. the need for temporary access – can the need be filled by someone already holding the necessary clearance?
 - b. confirmation from AGSVA or another authorised vetting agency that the person has no identified security concerns, or has ever had a clearance cancelled or denied
 - c. what consequences arising from compromise to the information could cause
 - d. how that access will be supervised and/or audited
 - e. other risk mitigations, such as pre-employment screening checks, character assessments and/or knowledge of personal/work history.
41. The originator or owner of the security classified information **should** be notified, and agreement sought to make the information available.
42. Confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements **may** be appropriate to reinforce all requirements to protect the information.

¹¹ This is considered to be children under 10 years of age

¹² Provisional access **may** be granted to personnel up until a clearance application is granted or denied.

¹³ Monitoring and audit logging (related audit trails) are key measures to control access to ICT systems and the information held on those systems. For further information about developing and maintaining robust ICT systems SAPSF policy [Robust ICT and cyber security](#).



43. Temporary access to caveated information must be approved by the caveat owner based upon a risk-assessment considering compromise of that information.

DOCUMENT CONTROL

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CHANGE LOG

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1.0	25/11/2019	- First issue of policy
1.1	20/04/2020	- Classification protective marking examples changed to red colour - Removal of word 'your' throughout entire document
2.0	30/11/2022	- Supporting requirement V(a) moved to SAPSF policy INFOSEC1: Protecting official information - Definitions for 'personnel' and 'visitor' added. - Additional guidance added to Caveated information (paras 15-17)
2.1	22/07/2024	- Minor formatting fixes



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